Abstract: Libya's 2011 revolution enabled ordinary citizens and an emerging civil society to voice their demands on a variety of key issues including Libya's new constitution. Libyans faced the challenge of redefining and re-empowering national political institutions through the establishment of a new constitution. This article analyses a series of constitutional grassroots debates that were led by the Forum for Democratic Libya thereby unpacking insights not only into the constitutional process itself but also into the underlying expectations regarding a new political order in the country. We argue that the brief period of relative peace and stability in Libya between 2011 and 2013 presents a "golden age" of constitutional activities that created meaningful interface among Libyan citizens after decades of oppression. We argue however that although constitutional debates allowed for citizen engagement in the process of constitutional development it had little bearing on the outcomes of this process. Citizen demands remained unanswered due to deeply entrenched informal political practices causing activists to face the arduous task of trying to influence a formal process of constitutional development. Priority demands expressed by citizens in our research pointed to the need for Libyan political actors to address the creation of a new system of governance, civil liberties and three regional priorities namely immigration and citizenship in Southern Libya, reconciliation and justice in Western Libya, and natural resources in Eastern Libya. The priorities remain unaddressed in Libya and provide insights of priority issues that will require serious efforts in the future of a stable Libya.
democratically elected National Congress, which would in its turn appoint a constitutional body to draft a new constitution.
After an amendment to the Declaration in March 2012 stipulating that the constitutional drafting body would be elected rather than appointed, the elections of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) finally took place in February 2014. 3 These elections occurred at a time of widespread protests against the General National
Congress' refusal to hold parliamentary elections and its decision to extend its own mandate instead. The CDA enjoyed a short-lived support despite the low turnout at these elections, the boycotts by some ethnic minorities and the limited involvement of citizens and activists in formal constitutional dialogues. 4 However, by the time of the elections of a new national congress in June 2014, it was clear that this "golden age"
of activities about the constitution was coming to an end. The parliamentary elections were marked by low voter turnout, and a deteriorating security situation. By the summer of 2014 fighting had broken out between forces loyal to the outgoing GNC and those loyal to the newly elected congress. These armed clashes spread with increasing severity to produce another civil conflict and closed this window of opportunity to debate and enact a new constitution.
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The following analysis thus seeks to capture insights and priorities about the constitution and about governance as they emerged during this period of transition.
Such elements point to the dilemmas that the constitution and transition more broadly will have to address in order to produce a more stable form of government in the country. The constitution in its simplest term is a nation's highest legal reference to organize the shape of its governing institutions, the nature of citizen-state relations, and the sovereignty of the political system. 6 the constitution generated new forms of political and civic mobilization. 7 The newly found freedoms of civil society, media and political parties in Libya widened the scope of participation in the process of constitutional development. Yet, with the procedural and political delays of the drafting process, this increased participation also underscored the divisions and contested priorities present in post-Qaddafi Libya.
In this particular context, three myths about constitutional order in the country shaped Libyan's approaches to the problem of political order. The first myth was that of the first Libyan constitution of 1951 as setting an example for a modern (western, liberal) and democratic (wide consultation, regional representation) constitutional process. In this perspective, the new constitutional opening initiated in 2011
represented an opportunity to set the clock back to a time when Libya was a political example for the region. In this narrative, it was a time when local, regional and international issues could be peacefully resolved; a time before the failures of the monarchy (authoritarian centralization) and of Qaddafi (neo-sultanism).
The second myth was that of the clean slate. There was the perception that the new constitution would inaugurate a truly new political order as there was no genuine constitutional and institutional order in the Jamahiriya. There was therefore a tendency to downplay the practical importance of the informal institutional and normative systems that structured social and political processes under Qaddafi.
Unsurprisingly it was then 'rediscovered' that religious norms (for example articulated in demands for the return sharia law), as well as regional, tribal and local power structures and preferences (articulated in the demands for federalism, Berber and other minorities' rights, etc.) shaped and placed specific constraints on the constitutional process.
The third and probably most potent myth was that of the new Libyan citizen.
Participation in and formulation of a new constitutional system was meant to shape and entrench a form of Libyan citizenship that could not exist before. It was meant to fulfil the promises of the first constitution by enabling the merging of multiple identities and preferences that would underpin an effective model of governance. This narrative fed from the first myth by downplaying the multiple causes of failure of the constitutional order of the 1950s and overemphasising role of the constitution in resolving outstanding issues and dilemmas.
In the following, we use these myths to investigate the contemporary reformulations of formal political order in Libya as outlined by the citizens taking part in constitutional dialogues organised by non-governmental organizations in 2012-2013. We contextualize these experiences with constitution-making to highlight the processes and thematic issues that Libyans found important as they sought to entrench new forms of political order in post-revolution Libya. there were more than 13,000 Jews in addition to a few hundred Greeks residing in Libya.
17
The third important characteristic of the 1951 process was the Committee of 21 members that was selected by the Pelt Commission after months of consultations in the three providences. Although there were demographic disparities, the commission agreed to appoint the same number of 7 representatives from each region to give equitable hearing to each of them. Only two conditions were set for these representatives: that they should not be members of the main political parties and that an opportunity would be given to non-partisan actors to participate in the General
Assembly. 18 The Assembly itself comprised 60 members, 20 from each province, and was responsible for drafting the constitution. Book is there a reference to agents performing a role similar to that of a lawmaker.
Instead it is claimed that anyone who has 'the boldness to proclaim the will of the society' opens 'the way to dictatorship'. 36 The typical functions of a formal constitution that would normally delineate power and authority and organize relations between citizens and the state, as well as between different branches of government,
were thus mainly irrelevant in Qaddafi's Jamahiriya.
It would take Libyans 41 years, but in 2011 they would eventually burn and ridicule the Green Book in the street protests against Qaddafi that started in Benghazi in February 2011. The protestors said it had allowed Qaddafi to act with impunity and had disregarded the responsibilities of the state and the rights of the citizens. 37 It was telling that at the start of the revolution, citizens directed their hatred not only towards pictures of Qaddafi himself but towards his book. From early on in the uprisings, Libyans took to the streets to call for reforms, including the introduction of a constitution.
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As with 1951 constitution, in the aftermath of the Libyan revolution, important questions were not asked about the dismantling of the Jamahiriya. While the lack of a formal constitution certainly gave freedom to interpret the Green Book any way the regime wanted, this did not make Libya that different from other regimes in the region where the presence of formal constitutions was hardly a hindrance for autocratic rule.
In addition, the neo-sultanistic system of governance underpinned by the Green Book did also reflect a power balance between different groups, and national preferences.
For all the empty rhetoric contained in the ideological guidelines that were meant to replace a formal constitution, the ever-evolving authoritarian system put in place by
Qaddafi over the years took into account the strength of the various social groups that could mobilize against the regime (tribes, armed forces, religious groups, etc.). Hence the formal absence of a constitutional order did not amount to the absence of constraints on governance in the Jamahiriya.
New citizens and new politics: public engagement with the constitutional process Under the Jamahiriya, there were only about 30 registered NGOs which were service-driven and government funded. In post-revolutionary Libya, civil society organizations (CSO) activities suddenly heavily outnumber governmental initiatives. Assembly elections and the appointment of a Committee of 60 to draft the constitution. 46 The elections to the national assembly that took place on 7 July 2012 were considered by many as a milestone for Libya's democratic transition. However violent incidents in the East during the elections changed the original timetable and led the chairman of the NTC Mustafa Abdul Jalil to announce that the constitutional drafting committee would be elected directly by the people in order to ease tensions 43 Ibid. 44 Aya El Tayeb, an activist who helped launch the constitutional dialogues on a bus tour across Libya, indicated that H2O's mission was to reach out and make citizens feel that they have a voice in this process. 
Unanswered demands
To address some of the issues behind the debates about the constitution, we equality between men and women, particularly in relation to a religious understanding of equality. The issue of minorities was also a divisive issue, with some demanding the official recognition of the Tamazight language and others requiring that Arabic remained the only official language.
On the basis of these preliminary results FDL selected three set of issues for focus groups to address: (1) the system of governance, (2) civil liberties, and (3) regional priorities. Locations for these focus groups included post-conflict towns, locations with recurrent tensions and violence, towns with Gadhafi loyalists. 55 The following section presents the top ranking propositions chosen in 15 dialogue sessions that brought together just over 900 participants in the Eastern Region (Benghazi, Derna, Tobruk, and Ajdabia), the Southern Region (Sebha, Murzuq, and Ubari), and the Western Region (Tripoli, Jadu, Bani Walid, Sirte, Misrata, Zawaya, Zleiten, and Khoms).
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The system of governance (nitham al hokm) was widely debated as the inequalities in the economy and political sphere had made government a sensitive issue. Between 2012 and 2013 calls for a federal system emanating from, but not restricted to, social and political actors in the eastern region were on the rise. When debating the constitution, participants in the dialogues saw the relevance of a new governance system for the relations between citizens and state, especially in terms of guaranteeing political freedom and minority rights, and improving economic fairness.
At the outset the most popular view was that constitution should give some form of autonomy to local councils. From the frequency of the answers provided, FDL noted that a majority of participants in the eastern areas supported a full-fledged federal system, while this was not the case in the west and south. 57 The other most popular view was that the constitution should account for decentralization within a unified state. While the terms "federalism" or "decentralization" were politically loaded, citizens who participated in the discussions across the regions had similar objectives regarding a redistribution of goods and services. The only regional disparities were that these views were expressed via pro-federalist discourse in the East, while they were voiced as concerns about marginalization in western areas (especially in those 55 For a detailed account see Geha. Civil Society and Political Reform in Lebanon and Libya. 56 One of the authors, Carmen Geha, was a facilitator in these meetings. 57 The Forum for Democratic Libya, "Libyan's Recommendations for a New Constitution," Briefing Report, Tripoli, July 2013.
towns that were deemed not to have taken part in the revolution), and constructed as demands for better representation in the southern areas.
Concerning civil liberties (al horriyat al aama) FDL again estimated via the frequency of answers given that the most common view was that freedom is about political participation and accountability rather than private liberties. 58 The second most supported opinion was that freedom was about every aspect of life including religion, public expression and right of assembly. Libyans having lived for 42 years of almost complete de-politicization of public life with a regime that forbade political parties, independent media outlets, religious militancy and civil society activism, it was unsurprising that a mutually agreed perspective on civil liberties was hard to come by. Participants defined the issue of freedom as relevant to the constitution mainly because it facilitated accountability and prevented a monopoly of political power. They linked the protection of civil liberties to the need to enhance political stability. In particular they stressed that these freedoms should guarantee the right of expression and association, as participants often wanted to form organizations, media outlets, and political parties themselves. In addition, they considered civil liberties to be useful for the development of new economic activities, again often with a personal agenda in mind. Finally, although civil liberties were strongly endorsed by all participants, they was a clear willingness to mention their conformity to sharia law, as no one wanted to appear to be directly challenging this Islamic principle.
Finally regarding the issue of regional priorities, focus groups from different regions of Libya showed some significant differences regarding the prioritizations of the abovementioned generic themes. In the Eastern region, the main priority of governance was the state control of oil and natural resources. Participants identified this issue almost unanimously in connection to a need to reform the welfare state and to redistribute oil revenues more fairly. They saw the management of oil and natural resources as indicative of whether the political system deserved the trust of its citizens. Hence, they wanted the constitution to include a mechanism for direct investment outside of Tripoli, as well to enshrine principles of transparency that would avoid mismanagement. An additional concern of the participants in this region was how to create alternative sources of revenues outside the oil and gas sector.
58 Nebbe f Dostoory Initiative, The Recommendations of Libyans.
Importantly, natural resources were equated it with peace, stability and economic development in the context of a local management of these resources.
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In the Southern region, the main priorities had to do with citizenship and immigration. Participants explained that to be a citizen involves an administrative procedure that recognizes one's ability to access resources and benefits, and provides a shared identity regardless of people's origin. They recognized that citizenship had cultural, economic and political implications especially when it came to women's ability or inability to pass citizenship to their husbands and children. They wanted the constitution to address how Libyan citizenship could be obtained and set standards to solve the issue of immigration and stateless citizens, especially in the southernmost regions (Chad and Niger borders). 60 The access to citizenship was directly linked by participants to identity and belonging. There were tens of thousands of Libya-born individuals in the south with no recognized citizenship and no standard procedure for obtaining Libyan citizenship. Participants saw these issues directly related to security and basic rights. In the historically marginalized southern regions, the quest of participants was very much about livelihood. The right to obtain citizenship for a number of stateless people, particularly from the Tabu ethnic group, was considered as a basic need to enable them to access employment, residency and health services from the state.
In the Western region the main priorities centred on the issues of justice and reconciliation. Participants in this region stressed that the absence of justice both for crimes committed during and before the revolution was creating polarization and causing more violence. They assessed that reconciliation efforts were primarily needed to identify who could take part in the political process, to demilitarize armed 59 Ibid. 60 Under the first Libyan constitution, the 1954 citizenship law of King Idriss stipulated that citizenship was granted by birth, residency, or from a child's mother or father. In 1980, under the Jamahiriya, Colonel Qaddafi changed Libyan citizenship to 'Arab citizenship' and determined that nationality should be given to anyone who claimed allegiance to the Arab nation. When Qaddafi's aspiration for Arab unity changed, the basis upon which Libyan nationality was to be granted also changed as he opened the door to immigration from neighbouring Africa states in the Southern region. This constitutional ( groups, and to deal with continuing violence in some areas. They wanted the constitution to include the mechanisms of justice that tribal leaders had successfully used in the past, and they saw a need to rebuild the judiciary while preserving local customs. 61 The 2011 uprising was a divisive issue for residents in the Western region as it created deep divisions between the rebels and the Qaddafi loyalists. Participants all noted that reconciliation and even forgiveness of crimes committed was necessary for the Western region -including the "middle regions," where the civil conflict was most intense -to be stable again.
In parallel to this FDL process, one of the authors conducted a survey asking participants in these dialogues how they viewed the impact of citizens' involvement in this type of a political process. 62 Only 14% of the respondents stated that they viewed the collective impact of civil society as 'highly effective' and therefore expressed doubts that they could have an influence over the political process. The main reason for their participation in the constitutional debates was to have some kind of 'representation' (60%). Participants were also skeptical about the level of openness and responsiveness from decision-makers with only 14% of respondents believing that decision-makers displayed high level of openness to citizens' views. While casting doubt on the responsiveness of decision-makers, they nonetheless believed that the average citizen had a role in shaping the constitution (77%). This role was said by 66% to be generally through 'direct actions 'that included taking part in dialogue processes, participating in meetings, voicing opinions in the media, and voting in the referendum. In addition, 79% of respondents believed that their participating in the constitution was beneficial to them (more representation, influence and knowledge gained).
The multiple political and socio-economic priorities and dilemmas present in post-Qaddafi's Libya underscored the difficulty of the task of the constitutional drafting committee in formalizing a text that would generate and maximize consensus.
Although the question of the system of governance in Libya appeared to be a divisive issue, once the terminology of federalism is taken out, the focus is on the sharing the national resources in order to build a national infrastructure (education, health, 61 Ibid. 62 The survey's 572 respondents were divided into 75% males and 25% females (illustrating women's reluctance to participate openly in the areas visited). The respondents were 27.7% from the South, 31.3% from the West, and 41% from the East. One of the main reasons a formal interaction could not be established was that at the time Libya still had no constitutional drafting body, two years after the production of the interim constitutional declaration. Unlike in other transitional system where the constituent assembly acts as parliament and as constitutional assembly, in Libya, the GNC only played a role in the constitutional process by determining how the constitutional drafting body was to be chosen. Hence, in a continuation of the earlier patterns of "formal informality," popular mobilization on constitutional issues was directed at the GNC, even though the GNC was not formally involved in drafting the constitution. 68 The informality of the relationships between citizens or non-governmental actors and politicians certainly facilitated the creation of communication channels with GNC representatives. However, because this informality applied principally to those with contacts and/or proximity with the
Tripoli elite, it commonly ended up perpetuating the type of patronage system that had characterised the Jamahiriya. 
